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I. ADOPTION OF CHILDREN
In the case of McIntyre v. Doe,' an attempt was made to revoke a
surrender of a child after expiration of the statutory period for

revocation. 2 Both the trial court and the supreme court held that
the statutory provisions were mandatory and that there must be
substantial compliance with them in order to effect a revocation.
The surrender had been accomplished as prescribed by statute.3 The
natural mother of the child some two to four months later stated
informally to the chancellor that she wished to revoke the surrender,
but she did not return to accomplish the revocation within the prescribed time. On the last day of the statutory period her attorney
filed a petition for revocation and held another informal discussion
of the matter with the chancellor. The mother did not appear at
this conference, and when a hearing was later held the chancellor
ruled that the statutory requirements had not been met. In affirming,
the supreme court noted that the statutes do not contemplate the
filing of a petition for revocation and that the procedure followed was
* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Trabue, Minick, Sturdi-

vant &Harbison, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. 332 S.W.2d 191 (Tenn. 1960).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-117 (1956).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-114 (1956). The surrender occurred before the
effective date of the 1959 amendment, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-112 through -14
(Supp. 1960), and accordingly both it and the revocation were governed by
the earlier statutes.
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ineffectual. The parent had ample opportunity to appear before the
judge in chambers to revoke the surrender in the prescribed manner
if she had desired to do so.
II. PERSONS IN Loco PARENTIS
In a case of first impression, the supreme court held that prospective
adoptive parents of a child have an insurable interest in the life of
the child.4 The foster parents had acquired the child from a licensed
agency and had entered into a contract with the agency under which
they were to have the care and custody of the child but were not
to file adoption proceedings without consent of the agency. The
agreement was subject to termination by either party. While in
custody of the child, the foster parents procured a policy of insurance
on its life. Later they returned the child to the agency and undertook
to assign the policy to a bank under a trust agreement for the benefit
of the child, the agency and a charity. They continued to pay the
premiums on the policy until suit was filed by the insurer to cancel
the policy for lack of insurable interest in the foster parents. The
chancellor held that the policy was void, although he found that it had
been procured in good faith.
Reversing, the supreme court held that a person standing in loco
parentis to a child has sufficient relationship to him to have an insurable interest in his life. Under Tennessee law, an insurable interest
need exist only at the time the policy is procured. 5 Therefore the
later surrender of the child did not affect the validity of the policy.

III. DIVORcE, ALImONY AND COUNSEL FEES
1. Venue.-The subject of venue in divorce actions was discussed
in Ensley v. Ensley.6 The parties had resided in Campbell County,
Tennessee until the wife was adjudged incompetent. She was committed to a hospital in Knox County. The husband filed suit for divorce in Knox County, alleging that the parties were residents of
Campbell County. The guardian ad litem for the wife filed a plea in
abatement which was sustained by the trial court. The supreme
court affirmed.
In divorce cases, venue, in the case of residents of the state,
may be in the county "where the parties resided at the time of their
4. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Pioneer Bank, 327 S.W.2d 59 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1959). For further discussion of this case, see Andersen, Insurance-1960

Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. REv. 1143 (1960).
5. Marquet v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 Tenn. 213, 159 S.W. 733, 1915B L.R.A.
749 (1913).

6. 326 S.W.2d 481 (Tenn. 1958).
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separation, or in which the defendant resides, or is found ....
7
Divorce is a transitory action, and the defendant may properly be
served in a county other than his residence. 8 There is, however, a
general venue statute which localizes transitory actions when the
parties are residents of the same county. 9
In the present case, the wife was deemed unable to change her
residence because of her incompetency. 0 Consequently both parties
resided, legally, in the same county when the suit was filed, and the
restrictive statute applied.
2. Jurisdiction.-The case of Baber v. Baber" dealt with the question of whether there had been sufficient acts of cruelty committed
within the state to permit a divorce, and with the proof required to
establish acts of cruelty. The only act alleged by the complainant was
that his wife had admitted to him her adultery in another state. The
admission occurred in a motel room in Tennessee.
In a somewhat cryptic opinion the supreme court affirmed the
action of the trial court in dismissing the suit. The court stated that
cruelty is usually considered to be a persistent course of conduct extending over a period of time.12 It is possible, of course, for a single
act to be so severe as to meet a statutory definition of cruelty. 13 In
the present case the court simply held that a single unwitnessed admission of misconduct is, by itself, insufficient to meet the statutory
requirement. The holding on this point seems satisfactory on the
facts given in the opinion.
The court stressed further the fact that the admission by the wife
was uncorroborated. Corroboration of the confessions or admissions
of a guilty party is frequently required, 14 but it is not clear from the
present opinion whether the court was announcing a general rule
that there must be corroboration in all cases or whether it was merely
dissatisfied with the evidence in the instant case. It is, of course,
well settled that the testimony of the complaining party in divorce
cases must be supported by corroborating evidence where such can
be obtained, 15 and it may be that the court felt that the complainant's
own evidence was too meager to permit a divorce decree.
3. Cancellation of Decree.-In the case of Hill v. Hill16 the wife had
7. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-804 (1956).

8. Williams v. Williams, 193 Tenn. 133, 244 S.W.2d 995 (1951).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-401 (1956).
10. Hannon v. Hannon, 185 Tenn. 307, 206 S.W.2d 305 (1947).
11. 330 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1959).
12. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661 (W.S. 1955).
13. 17 Am. JuR. Divorce and Separation§ 54 (1957).

14. 17 Am. Jum. Divorce and Separation § 420 (1957).
15. Greene v. Greene, 309 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
16. 326 S.W.2d 851 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
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been awarded a decree of divorce upon substituted service of process,
alleging that her husband was a non-resident whose whereabouts was
unknown. Approximately a year later the husband filed the present
suit to set aside the divorce for fraud, claiming that his wife had
sworn falsely with respect to the above allegations, and also alleging
that his marriage to her was void because of his previously existing
marriage. The chancellor found that the husband had had full knowledge of the divorce action, had made no effort to oppose it, and that
he was guilty of laches in making a belated attack upon the divorce
decree.
The court of appeals affirmed, pointing out that if the allegations
of the present bill were true, then the wife would clearly have been
entitled to a divorce in all events because of the previous marriage of
the husband.' 7 The findings of laches and of waiver were also affirmed
since no excuse for the delayed attack was offered.
4. Alimony and Counsel Fees.-Four cases were reported during
the survey period dealing with various aspects of alimony awards.
(a) Discretion To Deny Alimony.-In the case of Mount v. Mountl8
there had been a limited divorce awarded to the wife on grounds of
cruelty. She had been granted monthly support and counsel fees,
and leave had been given to either party to apply within one year
to make the divorce absolute. Accordingly the present petition was
filed by the wife within the one year period, seeking the absolute
divorce. At the hearing the chancellor granted her the divorce but
said that neither party was at fault and declined to award alimony to
the wife.
The court of appeals reversed insofar as the trial court had declined
to allow alimony. It pointed out that the chancellor had already
adjudged the husband guilty of cruelty and that the ultimate divorce
decree was entered pursuant to this finding. When the wife is the
guilty party, alimony may not be awarded to her under Tennessee
law, 9 but when she is the prevailing party in the divorce action, wide
discretion is given the courts as to the type and amount of alimony
which may be awarded.2 0 In the present case, it was held to be an
abuse of discretion to refuse any award at all.
(b) In Solido-In Futuro.-The parties in the foregoing case had
entered into a stipulation regarding the assets of the husband, so that
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-801(2) (1956).
18. 326 S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
19. TEwN. CODE ANN. § 36-826 (1956). An

attempted award of alimony in

such cases is beyond the jurisdiction of the court and is void. Brown v.
Brown, 198 Tenn. 600, 281 S.W.2d 492 (1955).
20. TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 36-821 to -23 (1956).
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it was possible for the appellate court to fix alimony without remanding the case to the trial court for proof. Since the husband had a
substantial income and a moderate amount of accumulated assets, the
court of appeals awarded the wife part of the assets and a specified
periodic support, subject to modification in the event of altered circumstances of the parties.
The award finally made, therefore, was a combination of alimony
in solido and alimony in futuro. There is, of course, no absolute
formula for determining the amount or kind of alimony to be awarded
in all cases. As allowed in Tennessee, alimony is deemed to be in
lieu of the husband's obligation to support the wife during the marriage.2 1 Alimony in solido is usually favored when the estate of the
husband will permit, but some form of periodic support is necessary
in the great majority of cases.
It was possible for the court to award only alimony in solido in
the case of Raskind v. Rasind.22 The husband had a very substantial
estate and a large annual income. The wife had contributed her earnings and part of her inheritance to the family assets before the husband's income had become substantial. In fixing alimony, the trial
court awarded her an amount of real estate approximately equivalent
to her contributions to the family funds. In addition she was allowed
alimony and counsel fees in the amount of ninety-five thousand
dollars.
In affirming the award, the court of appeals stated that alimony in
futuro should not be allowed despite the earning power of the husband, since the estate was sufficient to permit substantial alimony in
solido. The court did correct an error of the trial court in taxing the
counsel fees as court costs, since such fees are generally considered
to be part of the alimony decree.23 It affirmed the action of the trial
court in assessing only part of the total counsel fees of the wife
against the husband. Since the wife's contribution to the family
funds had been restored to her, it was deemed equitable that she
bear part of the fees of her attorneys.
(c) Duty To Pay Counsel Fees.-In the case of Thomas v. Thomas, 24
the court of appeals held that the former husband may be required
to pay counsel fees of his former wife in proceedings brought subsequent to divorce for the enforcement of alimony. Although such has
long been the practice in Tennessee, there has been no previously
reported case clearly so holding. Courts in other states are divided on
21.
22.
23.
24.

Rush v. Rush, 33 Tenn. App. 496, 503, 232 S.W.2d 333, 336 (W.S. 1949).
325 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
Riley v. Riley, 9 Tenn. App. 643 (W.S. 1929).
330 S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
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the question.25 The husband contended that since the parties were
no longer married, he had no obligation to provide legal services to
his former wife. Under Tennessee statutes, however, decrees for
periodic support are expressly retained within the jurisdiction of the
divorce court.26 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that proceedings to enforce a support order are merely continuations of the
original divorce proceedings, and counsel fees are properly allowable
to the former wife.
(d) Court Alteration of Support Agreement.-In this case the trial
court had allowed the wife three hundred dollars per month as
support despite the fact that at the time of the divorce, many years
earlier, the parties had made a separation agreement allowing only
one hundred dollars per month. This action was affirmed, since the
courts are not bound by the terms of a private contract between the
parties regarding periodic support, but may modify such contracts
as circumstances require.27 Besides making the additional award,
however, the trial court had ordered the payments to continue beyond
the date specified in the contract for termination of support payments.
The court of appeals reversed this portion of the decree as being
premature and directed that the question of continuance of the
payments be reserved until the expiration date arrived.
(e) Attachment of Property-Non-Residents.-A non-resident wife
attempted to attach Tennessee real estate owned by her husband in
Pierce v. Pierce.28 Both parties resided in Illinois, and the wife had
been awarded separate maintenance there. She had not sought a
specific amount of alimony, however, because the husband was not
employed and owned no property in Illinois. She filed the present
suit in Tennessee to attach the land and have it awarded to her as
alimony.
Both the trial court and the supreme court held that the Tennessee
courts had no jurisdiction to attach the property under the allegations
29
of the bill. The suit had been filed under the attachment statutes.
Under these statutes, when both parties are non-residents and live
in the same state, an attachment can be obtained in Tennessee only
upon allegation that the defendant has removed his assets to this
state to avoid the processes of the courts of his home state. 30 No such
allegation was made in the present case, and there was no allegation
25. Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 1252 (1951); 17 Am. JuR. Divorce and Separation §
640 (1957).
26. TENN CODE ANN. § 36-820 (1956),
27. Doty v. Doty, 37 Tenn. App. 120, 260 S.W.2d 411 (W.S. 1952); Osborne v.
Osborne, 29 Tenn. App. 463, 197 S.W.2d 234 (E.S. 1946).
28. 325 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn.1959).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-601, -608, -609, -646 (1956).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-609 (1956).

29.
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that he was about to dispose of his assets fraudulently so as to justify
*an equitable attachment apart from the statutes. 31 There was no apparent reason why judgment for alimony could not have been obtained in the Illinois courts. Suitable steps could then have been
taken, either in Illinois or in Tennessee, to enforce such a decree.
5. Jointly-owned Property.-In Hill v. Hill32 the husband was
awarded a divorce from his wife. The parties owned their home as
tenants by the entirety. The husband sought to have his wife's interest in the property vested in himself. A statute enacted shortly after
the deed to the parties authorizes a divorce court to vest jointly-owned
property in the husband when the husband is awarded a divorce,
under proper circumstances. 33 The trial court, however, declined to divest the wife of her interest, and the court of appeals affirmed. As in
several previous cases, 34 the court held that the trial court has wide
discretion as to the use of this statutory power. It also expressed
doubt as to whether the statute could affect a deed executed before
35
its effective date.
IV. FAMILY

IMMUNITY IN TORT

Two cases decided during the survey period dealt with the question
of family immunity in tort.
In Prince v. Prince3 6 the supreme court adhered to a number of
previous decisions to the effect that spouses may not maintain tort
actions against each other under Tennessee law.3 7 The court has permitted such actions to be maintained in the state courts where the
tort occurred in another state and was governed by the law of such
state,38 but it refused to depart from its earlier rule in the instant case
insofar as Tennessee substantive law is concerned. The existence of
liability insurance was held not to affect the result.
31. See 2 GIBSON, SUITS IN CHANCERY § 928 & n. 107 (5th ed., 1956).
32. 329 S.W.2d 840 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
33. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, ch. 90, § 1. The statute was re-written and
broadened in 1959. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-825 (Supp. 1960); Harbison,
Domestic Relations-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1189
(1959).

34. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661 (W.S. 1955);
Humphreys v. Humphreys, 39 Tenn. App. 99, 281 S.W.2d 270 (W.S. 1954);
Grant v. Grant, 39 Tenn. App. 539, 286 S.W.2d 349 (W.S. 1954); Harbison,
Domestic Relations-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 990, 997 (1956).
35. Humphreys v. Humphreys, supra note 33.
36. 326 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. 1959), 27 TENN. L. REv. 422 (1960).
37. Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932); Tobin v. Gelrich,
162 Tenn. 96, 34 S.W.2d 1058 (1931); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57,
179 S.W. 628, 1916B L.R.A. 881 (1915). See generally, Sanford, Personal
Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823 (1956).
38. Lucas v. Phillips, 326 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. 1957) (applying Arkansas
statutes); cf. Franklin v. Wills, 217 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1954) (federal courts
in Tennessee applying North Carolina law).
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In Brown v. Selby,39 however, the administrator of a divorced wife
was allowed to maintain a tort action against the former husband
despite the fact that the beneficiaries would be children of the marriage. The husband had murdered his former wife, and her administrator filed a wrongful death action. The trial court sustained a demurrer on the ground that a minor child may not sue its father in
tort.40 Since the children were the sole beneficiaries of the action, he
felt that the suit was an indirect action by them against their father.
In reversing, the supreme court pointed out that the right of action
would have been in the mother had she lived, and that with her divorce, all immunity between her and the former husband had ceased.
The mere fact that the recovery for her death would go to her children, therefore, was held not to prevent assertion of the cause of
action.
V.

TENANcY BY THE ENTIRETIES

The effect of a partition deed to husband and wife was considered
in Johnson v. Beard.41 The wife, her brother and her sister inherited
property from their father as tenants in common. Thereafter by voluntary deeds they partitioned the land in kind. The conveyance of
the wife's portion of the property was made to her and her husband.
In proceedings to construe the deed many years later, it was insisted
that the effect of the deed was to create an estate by the entireties.
Both the chancellor and the supreme court held, however, that the
husband acquired no interest under the deed. Following an earlier
decision,42 the court held that a voluntary partition deed "passes no
title and creates no new estate but merely effects a severance of possession, whereby an estate theretofore owned jointly, is thereafter
owned in severalty." 43 Under modern law, it would have been possible
for the wife, after receiving the partition deed, to have made a new
conveyance to her husband so as to create an estate by the entireties,44
but the partition deed itself was ineffectual to do so.
39. 332 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1960), 27 TENN. L. REv. 614 (1960).

40. Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); McKelvey
v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664, 64 L.R.A. 991 (1903).
41. 332 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1960).

42. Holt v. Holt, 185 Tenn. 1, 202 S.W.2d 650, 173 A.L.R. 1210 (1947).
43. 332 S.W.2d at 209.
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-110 (Supp. 1960).

